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Abstract 
Recent empirical studies reveal that the oil price-output relationship is weakening 
in the US. Oil price-output correlation is less negative, and output reduction in 
response to oil price rise is more moderate after mid 1980s. In contrast to the 
conventional view that there have been changes in the economic structures that 
have made output less responsive to oil price shocks, we show that what have 
changed are the sources of oil price variation. We develop a DSGE model where 
oil price and US output are endogenously determined by the exogenous 
movements of US TFP and the oil supply. Having no changes in economic 
structure, our model yields dynamics of the oil price and output that show a 
weakening in the oil price-output relationship. There are changes in the way that 
the exogenous variables evolve. Two changes are important. First, oil supply 
variation has become moderate in recent years. Second, oil supply shortage is no 
longer followed by a large decline in TFP. We show that less volatile oil supply 
variation results in less negative oil price-output correlations, and a smaller TFP 
decline during oil supply shortfall implies a smaller output decline during oil price 
increases.  
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Many studies have reported that recessions in the US economy are related to political events in the
Middle East, and subsequent rises in the oil price. For example, Hamilton (1983, 1996), Hooker
(1996) show that most US recessions were preceded by increases in the oil price. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the macroeconomic impact of the oil shock has been analyzed by many economists
from several aspects. Kim and Loungani (1992) and Finn (2000) examine the role of exogenous oil
price variation as a source of US business cycle ￿ uctuations. Wei (2003) analyzes its implications
for the US stock market. Bernanke et al. (1997), Lee et al. (2001) and Leduc and Sill (2004)
discuss the oil price shocks in terms of monetary policy.
However, the claim that oil price shocks contribute to US recessions has become controversial,
as several authors report that the relation between oil price and economic activity becomes weaker
since the mid 1980s. Mork (1989) estimates a regression of US GDP on the real oil price and ￿nds
that the coe¢ cients of the oil price become less signi￿cant (less negative), when the mid 1980s are
used for the estimation. In addition, Hooker (1996a, b) and Hamilton (1996, 2003) also indicate
that oil price ￿ uctuations have had less impact on the US economy in the 1980s and 1990s than
before.
This weakening of the impact of oil crises is summarized in Figure 1. Following McConnell
and Perez-Quiros, (2000) and Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007), we split the postwar periods (1973:Q1
to 2007:Q4) into two subsample periods, and choose 1984:Q1 as the break point. The upper panel
shows the cross-correlation between the real oil price and US output for each of the two subsample
periods. The line for the pre-1984 period lies below that for the post-1984 period, indicating that
output tends to move in the opposite direction to oil price movements in the early in subsample
period compared with recent subsample period. The lower panel displays the impulse responses
of output to a unit rise in the real oil price for the two subsample periods. The responses are
estimated by bivariate VAR1. In the two years average after the shock, a unit rise in the oil price
generated a 3% decline in output from its trend value for the pre-1984 period, and it led to a less
than 1% decline in output from its trend for the post-1984 period. Clearly, the output decline
associated with the oil price rise has become moderate recently.
We present an explanation as to why the current oil price variation appears to be less important
for the US economy than before. Several early papers address the same question. Blanchard and
Gal￿ (2007) propose that there has been three structural changes in the US economy between
the two subsample periods, and that these changes made US output less responsive to oil price
changes. Those are: the decrease in real wage rigidities, the increased credibility of monetary
policy, and the decrease in the share of oil in consumption and in production. They point out that
all three changes play important roles. Along the same lines, Katayama (2007) mentions that the
deregulation of the transportation sector, the overall improvement of energy use of the economy,
and the persistency of the oil price are the important determinants of the weakening impact of the
oil price. We o⁄er a di⁄erent perspective on the same question. We focus on the fact that oil price
increases occur for several reasons. Fernald and Trehan (2005) argue that the oil price should be
highly correlated with output when oil price increases are driven by economic expansion. Killian
(2005, 2008) also stresses the importance of identi￿cation as to the sources of oil price variation.
In the current paper, we argue that the oil price variation is driven by the exogenous variables,
and that they evolve di⁄erently in a signi￿cant way between the two subsample periods. This
1Here we employ the residual of the oil price equation for oil price shock. Cholesky decomposition is one other way
to identify the real oil price shocks used in the literature. See Burbidge and Harrison (1984) and Jimenez-Rodriguez
and Sanchez (2004). Estimation results do not change by the use of Cholesky decomposition.
2di⁄erence leads us to observe a weakening impact of the oil price rise on output.
We set up a simple DSGE model that accounts for oil price variation and US output variation
over time. Both the oil price and output are determined endogenously by the exogenous changes
in oil supply and US TFP2. Taking the actual time path of the exogenous variables in the post-
war period as given, our model generates both oil price series and output series that are highly
correlated with the historical movement of the actual oil price and output. Similar to the actual
data, our model-generated series show a weakening impact of the oil price on output. That is, the
cross-correlation between the two variables is less negative, and the output reduction in response
to an oil price rise is smaller in the post-1984 period than in the pre-1984 period. A notable
feature of our analysis is that no change in the economic structures between the two subsample
periods are considered. The parameters are unaltered in the simulation. There is a weakening in
the observed impact of the oil price on output, because the time series properties of the exogenous
variables are not identical across the two subsample periods. Two key changes in the way that
exogenous variables evolve are important for understanding the reason for this weakening. First,
oil supply variation has decreased. Second, oil supply shortages are no longer followed by a large
decline of TFP. With less-volatile oil-supply variation, the portion of oil price variation explained
by oil supply variation decreases, leading to a less-negative oil price￿ output correlation. A smaller
TFP decline during oil supply shortfalls implies a smaller output decline during oil price increases.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. Our model is a two-
country model with the US and OPEC. In the model, US TFP and the oil supply are exogenous
variables, and the oil price and US output are endogenous variables. In Section 3, we simulate
the model using the actual time path of US TFP and the oil supply from 1973:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
The model-generated series captures the feature of actual time path of data closely, and displays
the weakening impact of the oil price between the two subsample periods. Section 4 is devoted to
examining the link between the way the exogenous variables evolve over time and the observed oil
price￿ output relationship. Section 5 concludes.
2 The economy
Two countries, the US and OPEC, are present in the model. There are three agents: the household,
the ￿nal goods producer, and the oil producer in the US. OPEC produces and sells its oil to the
US ￿nal goods producer in each period. The oil is used as a production input in the US, and the
equilibrium oil price is determined endogenously so as to clear the market.
2.1 Final goods producer
The ￿nal goods producer solves the following optimization problem:
max
ht;kt;Et
Yt ￿ wtHt ￿ rtKt ￿ ptEt; (1)













2Several previous studies, such as Kim and Loungani (1992) and Finn (1995, 2000), assume that the oil price
is exogenously determined, and analyze the equilibrium responses of the economy, given the realization of the oil
price shock. In contrast, we follow Backus and Crucini (2000) and Leduc and Sill (2007), where the oil price is
determined endogenously from a given sequence of exogenous oil supplies.
3where labor hours Ht, capital Kt, and oil Et are used to produce the ￿nal good Yt. Note that Yt is
gross output, and it di⁄ers from output yt (value added), which we de￿ne below. The ￿nal goods
producer acts as a price taker in both the product market and the input market, with the price of
the ￿nal good, normalized to be unity, real wage wt, real rental rate of capital rt, and real price of
oil pt taken as given. The production technology of the ￿nal goods producer is a nested Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function with constant returns to scale. The parameter v is the
elasticity of substitution between capital Kt and input of oil Et
3, ￿ is capital share, and ￿ is labor
share. zt is the technology variable, which is exogenously given.
2.2 Oil supply
Oil is supplied from the two sources, from the US and OPEC. The quantity of oil supplied at each















t are the oil supply from the US and OPEC, respectively4. For the US, ED and
EI are the domestic oil supply and imported oil supply at the steady state5. The sequence of ￿ED
t
and ￿EI
t are exogenously given. Note that EI
t and ED
t are homogenous so that they are subject
to the law of one price. All of the oil produced today is used today. The oil price adjusts so as to







The representative household is in￿nitely lived with preferences over consumption and leisure and
maximizes discounted utility (3). The household provides the ￿nal goods producer with capital
service and labor and receives compensation for them. Domestically produced oil ED
t is owned by








j [￿logCt+j + (1 ￿ ￿)log(1 ￿ Ht+j)]
#
; (3)
s:t: Ct+j + Kt+1+j ￿ wt+jHt+j + rt+jKt+j + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt+j + pt+jE
D
t+j; (4)
where Ct is consumption, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, ￿ is the preference parameter, ￿ 2 (0;1]
is the depreciation rate of the capital stock and the time endowment is normalized to unity. Our
utility function has a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. Notice
that for the household, the oil price pt appears as the return for lending the oil to the ￿nal goods
producing ￿rms.
3The speci￿cation of the oil usage is diverse across models. Our model is close to those of Kim and Loungani
(1992), Backus and Crucini (2000), de Miguel et al. (2004) and Hirata (2006). Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)
focuses on monopolistic competitive market. Wei (2003) employs putty￿ clay technology for oil usage. Finn (1995,
2000) links energy usage to capacity utilization.
4Our model has vertical supply curves for oil production. This speci￿cation is similar to those used in Backus
and Crucini (2000) and Leduc and Sill (2007).
5In the simulation below, we set the oil supply at the steady state equal to unity, and choose ED and EI based
on the import share of the oil supply in the US.
4Finally, we de￿ne output yt by the following equation:
yt ￿ Ct+j + Kt+1+j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt+j:
2.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a set of allocations, fYt; Ct; Kt; Ht; EI
t ; ED
t ; Et; yt; pt; wt; rtg1
t=0 that
satis￿es the following conditions: (i) the household￿ s allocation solves its utility maximization
problem; (ii) each producer￿ s allocations and the price solve its pro￿t maximization problem,
taking input prices as given; and (iii) all markets clear.
2.5 Parameter calibration
We choose conventional ￿gures for many of the parameters. That includes the subjective discount
factor ￿; the weight on leisure (1 ￿ ￿); the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ￿; the deprecia-
tion rate of capital ￿, and the labor share ￿: See Table 1 for details. Several views exist about the
elasticity of substitution between capital and oil input, v: We set v = 1=7; which falls between the
￿gures used in two prior studies by Kim and Loungani (1992) and Backus and Crucini (2000)6. ￿
is selected so that the share of the expenditure for oil purchases over the US output is 1%. We set
0.4 for the import share of the oil supply at steady state.
2.6 Model responses to changes in exogenous variables
In this subsection, we describe the responses of the endogenous variables in our model to the three
exogenous variables. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of the oil price and output to a change
in each of the three exogenous variables. We assume that the exogenous variables jump at t = 0;
by 1%, and that they gradually revert to their steady state values, with a quarterly autoregressive
parameter of 0.9. We consider the cases of a positive jump for TFP and a negative jump for oil
supplies.
The upper panel in Figure 2 indicates that the oil price increases in response to exogenous TFP
increase, and to exogenous oil supply shortfalls. Provided that the oil supply is unaltered during
the periods in which TFP deviates from its steady state value, higher TFP leads to higher demand
for oil as an input. This results in an oil price rise. Declines in either OPEC oil production or
US oil production reduces the availability of oil. At equilibrium, the oil price rises to dampen
the demand for oil. Output rises in the wake of the TFP increase, and declines during oil supply
shortages. It is important to note that TFP variation drives the oil price and output in the same
direction, while oil supply variation drives them in the opposite directions. There is quantitative
asymmetry between the impact of TFP and that of the oil supply on output. While a 1% increase
in TFP increases output by 1.5% in the period of the shock, a 1% oil supply shortfall reduces
output by only .02% at most. The e⁄ect of oil supply variation on output is limited, compared
with that of TFP. This observation holds true even if we change the oil expenditure share from 1%
to 4% (Barsky and Kilian, 2004), a percentage that is the maximum value among the empirically
reasonable ￿gures of oil expenditure. For the oil price variation, the quantitative e⁄ects are similar
across the exogenous variables.
6See the discussion in Apostolakis (1990) and Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) for details.
53 Simulation procedures
We conduct a deterministic simulation of the model. Using the actual time paths of OPEC oil
production, US oil production and US TFP, from 1973:Q1 to 2007:Q4, ￿ED
t ; ￿EI
t and zt are derived.
At 1973:Q1, the household knows all of the historical time paths of the exogenous variables up to
2007:Q4, and solves its optimization problem. The oil price and output are generated from the
equilibrium conditions of the model. Earlier works such as Kim and Loungani (1992) and Backus
and Crucini (2000) use a stochastic simulation rather than a deterministic simulation. However, the
sources of oil supply changes are often episode speci￿c. For example, the OPEC embargo of 1973￿
1974 and the OPEC meeting of 1999, were announced before they were realized, while abrupt oil
shortfalls accompanied by the con￿ icts in the Middle East are regarded as innovations. Isolating the
expected changes in oil production from the unexpected changes requires additional consideration
for the identi￿cation. A deterministic simulation does not involve assumptions related to this issue.
The exogenous variables that are used for our simulation are linearly detrended. Early studies
on oil price variation apply the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ￿lter with a smoothing parameter
equal to 400 (Kim and Loungani, 1992; Finn, 1995) or 100 (Backus and Crucini, 2000), to the
annual data. As Baxter and King (1999) discuss, the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) ￿lter with the
conventional smoothing parameters produces detrended series of the variables with a business cycle
frequency of 2 to 32 quarters (Comin and Gertler, 2006). We use linear detrending so as to add the
lower frequency variations into the analysis. In detrending the TFP series, we allow for a structural
break in the linear trend in 1997:Q1, following Kahn and Rich (2007) and Fernald (2007).
4 Simulation results
Our simulation results are reported in this section. Our model replicates the empirical regularities
associated with the time series of the oil price and output in the postwar period. The model-
generated series captures a sizable portion of the oil price variation and output variation over
the sample period. While all of the model parameters remain unaltered throughout the postwar
period, the weakening impact of the oil price is also found in the model-generated series. The oil
price￿ output cross-correlation is more negative, and the estimated output reduction in response
to an oil price rise is larger in the ￿rst subsample period than in the second subsample period.
Figure 3 shows the time paths for the model-generated series of oil price (upper panel) and
output (lower panel), from 1973:Q1 to 2007:Q4. All of the three exogenous variables are used in
the simulation to calculate the endogenous variables. In what follows, we refer to this simulation as
the benchmark simulation. We denote the actual data of the variables by lines with white circles,
and the model-generated series by lines with blue circles. Our model captures the major ups and
downs of the two variables that are examined in previous studies. For example, many of the oil
crisis episodes such as the oil price shock of 1974 (OPEC embargo), 1979￿ 1980 (Iranian revolution,
Iran￿ Iraq war), 1990 (invasion of Kuwait) and 1999 (OPEC meeting), and the downturn of 1986
(OPEC collapse) are obtained from the simulation.
Again, we split the sample periods into two subsample periods. The ￿rst subsample period
covers from 1973:Q1 to 1983:Q4, and the second subsample period covers from 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
The summary statistics of this simulation are reported in Table 2. As for the oil price variation,
the contemporaneous correlations between the actual data and model-generated series for the two
subsample periods are 0.69 and 0.56, respectively. Our model delivers a standard deviation that is
almost the same size as that of the data for the ￿rst subsample period, and a lower ￿gure than the
actual value for the second subsample period. As for the output variation, the contemporaneous
6correlations between the actual data and model-generated series for the two subsample periods are
0.92 and 0.75, respectively. The model yields a standard deviation that is almost the same size
as that of the data for the ￿rst subsample period, and gives a larger standard deviation than the
actual data for the second subsample period.
The model-generated series of the oil price and output exhibit a weakening impact of the oil
price in the post-1984 period, compared with the pre-1984 period. Similar to Figure 1, but using
the model-generated series instead of the actual data, we calculate the cross-correlation and the
impulse responses of output, for the two subsample periods. The upper panel in Figure 4 exhibits
the cross-correlation, and the lower panel shows the estimated output response. The lines with
blue circles are the estimates based on the ￿rst subsamples. The lines with white circles are the
estimates based on the second subsamples. It appears from the ￿gure that the oil price￿ output
cross-correlation is signi￿cantly lower, and the estimated output reduction in response to the oil
price increase is larger in the pre-1984 period than in the post-1984 period.
5 Accounting for the weakening of the oil price impact
We see above that the observed relationship between the oil price and output have changed over
the two subsample periods. In the model, the two variables are endogenously determined and all
of their variations are equilibrium responses to changes in exogenous variables. The observations
associated with the weakening of oil price impact imply that the statistical properties of the exoge-
nous variables, or their joint relationships, have changed over the two subsample periods. To see
this more clearly, we decompose the variations of the endogenous variables into a portion explained















dpt, dyt, dot, and dAt are deviations in oil price, output, oil supply and TFP, from their trend
values. Oil supply is the sum of OPEC and US oil production. @p=@o and @y=@o are the partial
derivatives of the oil price and output, with respect to changes in oil supply. Similarly, @p=@A
and @y=@A are the partial derivatives of the oil price and output, with respect to changes in TFP.
Roughly speaking, these terms represent the impulse responses of the two endogenous variables to
the exogenous variables, which are illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 suggests that @y=@o; @p=@A;
and @y=@A are positive, and (@p=@o) is negative. In addition, the term @y=@o is considered to
take a small value, compared with the other terms.
In the subsections below, using the approximations (5) and (6); we show that our two measures
of the oil price￿ output relation are expressed by the variations in the exogenous variables dot and
dAt. Changes in the way that the exogenous variables evolve between the two subsample periods,
yield the changes in the observed oil price￿ output relationship over the two periods.
5.1 Accounting for the correlation
We observe from Figure 1 and Figure 4 that the oil price￿ output cross-correlation became less
negative in the post-1984 subsample period, than in the pre-1984 subsample period. We show that
the change is attributable to a change in the statistical properties of the exogenous variables during
7these periods. That is, oil supply variation is reduced in the second period, making a negative oil
price￿ output relation less likely.
As equations (5) and (6) demonstrate, the variations of the endogenous variables are tied to
the variations in the exogenous variables. Our next step is to see how the correlation among the
endogenous variables is tied to the variations of exogenous variables. For convenience, we use the
covariance instead of the correlation. Using equations (5) and (6); the oil price￿ output covariance





































































































where Ts for s = 1;2 is the number of samples in the ￿rst period and the second period.
As for the second equality, we apply the argument that @y=@o is close to zero7. The covariance
is expressed as the product of term (@p=@AdAt + @p=@odot); multiplied by dAt: Equation (5)
indicates that (@p=@AdAt + @p=@odot) is equal to dpt: Note that Figure 2 suggests that @p=@A
is positive, while @p=@o is negative. Thus, the sign of this product term takes a positive value
when the two exogenous variables move in the opposite directions. When they move together and
oil supply variation is su¢ ciently larger than TFP variation, the sign is negative. We see below
that in general, the oil supply and TFP vary in the same direction, over the full sample period.
What breaks the two periods is the change in the relative size of the variations of each exogenous
variable. As variation of oil supply dot decreases compared with the variation of TFP dAt; the
observed oil price￿ output correlation takes a less negative value.
Time paths of exogenous variables
Figure 5 presents the time paths of the exogenous variables from 1973:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The
upper panel displays oil supply variation, the middle panel displays TFP variation, and the lower
panel displays the product of the two exogenous variables. The variations are shown in absolute
value of the deviation of each variable from their trend values. Three observations are important.
The ￿rst observation is the decline in oil supply variation. In terms of sample means, the absolute
value of oil supply variation declines by 66% in the second period, compared with the ￿rst period.
The second observation is about the direction of the variations. Oil supply and TFP tend to vary
in the same direction. For both periods, the sample mean of the product dotdAt takes a positive
value. In terms of timing, too, quarters they move in the same direction is more frequent than
those they go in opposite directions, in both periods. The third observation is the relative size of oil
7Figure 6 below indicates that this assumption is reasonable. Using only the time path of oil supply variation,
the model generates output series that hardly varies over time.
8supply variation, compared with TFP variation. For both subsample periods, oil supply variation
is greater than TFP variation. Because oil supply variation decreases by 66% in the second period
while TFP variation only decreases by 2%, their relative size has changed. On average, oil supply
variation is 4.3 times larger than TFP variation in the ￿rst period and 1.5 times larger in the
second period.
Role of exogenous variables over the two periods
The three observations together suggest that the change in the relative size of the variations
in the exogenous variables decreases the covariance. According to the last term of equation (7);
provided that the oil supply and TFP comove, as the portion of oil price variation explained by oil
supply variation @p=@odot decreases, the oil price￿ output covariance tends to be less negative. To
see that this statement holds in the actual data, we conduct two more simulations. In simulation
I, we only use the actual oil supply variation to generate the endogenous variables, setting TFP
variation equal to zero throughout the sample period. In simulation II, only the actual TFP
variation is used for the simulation. The model-generated oil price and output are shown in
Figures 6 and 7. In both ￿gures, the upper panel displays the result of simulation I, and the lower
panel displays that of simulation II.
The ￿gures illustrate the relative signi￿cance of each exogenous variable in explaining variations
in the oil price and output during the two periods. Oil supply variation is responsible for the
majority of oil price variation in the ￿rst period. The time path generated from simulation I follows
closely the time path generated from the benchmark simulation. Meanwhile, TFP variation only
produces small ￿ uctuations in the oil price. In the second period, it appears that TFP variation has
a relatively larger e⁄ect than before, especially after the late 1990s. On average, 87% of oil price
variation dpt is originated from oil supply variation in the ￿rst period, and this number declines
to 47% in the second period. Oil supply variation has become less important in explaining oil
price variation in recent years. As equation (7) states, this change yields the change in the oil
price￿ output correlation. On the other hand, for output variation, TFP variation explains almost
all of the variation over the two periods. Whereas the time paths generated from simulation II and
the benchmark simulation coincide, the impact of oil supply variation is hardly detectable. All of
the recessions8 that are discussed along with the oil price increases, are also due to TFP declines.
Rotemberg (2007) states that a small response of the economy to the oil price is more consistent
with ￿standard macroeconomic models.￿The share of oil expenditure is small and any decline in
oil input associated with the oil price rise has a limited e⁄ect on aggregate output. Our result is
consistent with their ￿ndings9.
5.2 Accounting for the impulse response
Our second observation is about the estimated impulse response of output to an oil price rise.
Following the oil price rise, a larger decrease in output is observed for the pre-1984 period, compared
with that in the post-1984 period (Figures 1 and 4). We show below that this unresponsiveness
8Barsky and Kilian (2004) report ￿ve US recessions that have followed oil price increases. Those are the recessions
of November 1973, January 1980, July 1981, July 1990 and March 2001.
9In the model, US recessions during oil price upsurge is therefore the outcome of that oil supply shortages and
TFP decline occur simultanously. The productivity declines in the US economy during the past oil crisis episodes
are reported in studies such as those of Bruno and Sachs (1985), Barsky and Kilian (2004), and Blanchard and Gal￿
(2007). For example, Barsky and Kilian (2004) point out that during the oil crisis from 1974 to 1985, the average
TFP growth rate was 0.31, which is exceptionally low compared with the other periods. Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007)
￿nd the presence of ￿large shocks of a di⁄erent nature￿ which coincide with the oil price shock in the 1970s.
9of output is due to the change in the joint realization of the exogenous variables. In the earlier
subsample period, an oil supply shortage is accompanied by a larger drop in TFP. In the latter
subsample period, this observation does not hold. Moderation of the output response to an oil
price rise is brought about by the moderation of TFP declines, conditional on the realization of
oil supply shortages.
To see this clearly, we focus on the two impulse response functions (IRFs) estimated from two
VARs. One is the output response to the oil price rise, and the other is the TFP response to the oil
supply shortfall. While we do not have a theoretical founding as to the law of motion for oil supply
and TFP, the latter IRF gives the description as to how they evolve in the two subsample periods.
Given the relationship between the endogenous variables and exogenous variables proposed in
equations (5) and (6); the two IRFs are directly related, and changes in the former IRFs are
explained by changes in the latter IRFs.


























j for j = 1;::q are scalars that give the law of motion to exogenous variables
dAt and dot: q is the number of lags. uA
t and uo
t are innovations in TFP and oil supply, respectively.



































k for k = 1;:::1; are the IRFs for the innovations uA
t￿k and uo
t￿k for
k = 1;:::1: Note that our VAR estimation for output and the oil price are also described by an































t￿k for k = 1;:::1 are the innovations in the equation for output and the oil








k for k = 1;:::1:
Our second measure of the weakening e⁄ect of the oil price, response of output to an oil price rise,
is captured by ’12
k for k = 1;:::1: Empirical analysis conducted in Figure 4 tells us that ’12
k has
become considerably smaller in the second subsample period compared with the ￿rst subsample
period, at least for k = 1;:::12: We show in the proposition below that changes in the dynamic law
of motions in the endogenous variables ’12




Proposition. Provided that equations (5) and (6) hold, and that @y=@o is approximately equal
to zero, the IRFs of ’12
k for k = 1;:::1 are linked with the IRFs of ￿
12















Proof. See Appendix A.
10According to equation (11); a larger ￿
12
k implies a smaller ’12
k : For example, if we suppose that
there is a larger decline in TFP following an oil supply shortage, then the observed output response
to the oil price becomes more negative. Equation (11) is consistent with our ￿ndings discussed in
earlier sections. We saw that TFP variation is responsible for almost all of the output variation
(Figures 2 and 7). The oil price rise is, on the other hand, accompanied by oil supply shortages if
it is co-occurring with an output decline (Figure 2). An observed larger output drop in response
to an oil price rise, in the ￿rst sub-sample period, comes from a larger decline of the TFP in the
￿rst subsample period than in the second subsample period, upon the oil supply shortages.
To see if there is a change in ￿
12
k ; we estimate VARs (9) for the two subsample periods. Figure
8 reports the IRFs of TFP to a unit decrease in the oil supply, ￿
12
k for k = 1;:::12: The lines with
blue circles are the estimates based on the ￿rst subsamples. The lines with white circles are the
estimates based on the second subsamples. For both subsample periods, TFP declines following
an oil supply shortfall, but there is a substantial di⁄erence in the size of the decline. In the earlier
subsample period, TFP decreases more than in the latter subsample period. As equation (11)
states, a larger ￿
12
k leads to a larger negative value of ’12
k : In other words, the larger output decline
in response to an oil price rise observed in the early subsample period is produced by a larger TFP
decline following the oil supply shortages that occurred in the early subsample period.
6 Conclusion
Existing empirical works regarding the co-occurrence of soaring oil prices and a decline in US
output suggest that this link has weakened in recent years. We estimate (i) the cross-correlation
between the oil price and output, and (ii) the impulse response of output to the oil price rise,
for the pre-1984 period and for the post-1984 period. Our two measures agree that the oil price￿
output link has weakened in recent years. Early studies, including that of Blanchard and Gal￿
(2007), stress the role of the structural changes in the US economy that have made US output less
responsive to oil price shocks. For example, changes in the wage rigidity, US production function
or changes in policy are claimed to lead to the weakening of the oil price e⁄ect. Our paper o⁄ers
an alternative view.
We focused on the causes of the variations in the oil price and output. Both the oil price
and output are determined by the exogenous sequence of oil supply and TFP. The changes in the
way that these exogenous variables evolve over time cause changes in the observed relationship
between the oil price and output. We developed a DSGE model with the US and OPEC, where oil
is traded between the two countries. Both the oil price and US output are endogenously determined
as equilibrium responses to exogenous variations in oil supply and TFP. With the actual time paths
of oil supply and TFP variation used in the simulation, our model yields the time series of the
oil price and output that are highly correlated with their actual variations. Without considering
any changes in economic structures, the oil price￿ output relationship of the model-generated series
has become weaker in recent years. The oil price￿ output cross-correlation is less negative, and the
output decline in response to the oil price rise has decreased in recent years.
We found that nearly all of the output variation can be explained by TFP variation, and the
oil price variation is explained by both oil supply variation and TFP variation over the postwar
periods. There are, however, changes in the way that these exogenous variables evolve between the
early period and the later period. Changes in the statistical properties of the exogenous variables
cause changes in the observed oil price￿ output relationship. Two changes in the realized pattern
of exogenous variables are important. First, oil supply variation has decreased. Second, oil supply
11shortages are no longer followed by a large decline in TFP. Less-volatile oil supply variation leads
to a less-negative oil price￿ output correlation, as the portion of oil price variation explained by oil
supply variation decreases. A smaller TFP decline during oil supply shortfalls implies a smaller
output decline during the oil price increase because TFP is responsible for output variation.
12A Appendix A
This section provides a proof of the proposition claimed in Section 5.2. Provided that approxima-
tions (5) and (6) hold; we ￿rst show that the residuals of the bivariate VAR estimation for output




t; are expressed by a linear combination of the residuals of
the bivariate VAR estimation for TFP and oil supply, denoted by uA
t and uo
t:
















I ￿ X (X0X)
￿1 X0 0













where t is the sample period, I is a t￿t identity matrix and X is a matrix that contains lagged
output and oil price11. X0 is the transpose of matrix X. Consider matrix Z, which is composed
of lagged TFP and oil supply series with the same number of lags as those of X: The relationship
expressed in equations (5) and (6) ensures that there is an invertible matrix ￿ that links the lagged
endogenous variables to the lagged exogenous variables, such that X = Z￿: The equations above

























































































Note that we apply our observation that @y=@o is negligible. Equations (5) and (6) provide an












































Combining equations (12) and (13) provides the relation between the two estimated IRFs








k for k = 1;:::1:
10Note that vy, vp; uA, uo;y and p are all t ￿ 1 column vectors.
11X is a t ￿ (2q + 1) matrix, where q is the number of lags employed in the VAR estimation.
13B Data appendix
Quantity series of oil supply
OPEC oil production series, US oil production series and US oil import series are taken from
￿World Crude Oil Production: OPEC Members,￿￿US Crude Oil Field Production￿and ￿US Crude
Oil Imports from All Countries,￿released by the Energy Information Administration, Department
of Energy. The three series are seasonally adjusted.
Real oil price
The nominal oil price is from ￿Crude Oil Composite Acquisition Cost by Re￿ners,￿released by
the Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy. Acquisition cost series is available
only from January 1974. Following Mork (1989), we extend the series forward to 1973. The series
is converted to quarterly values, using the quarterly GDP de￿ ator.
Real gross output









t is the nominal crude oil composite acquisition cost, EI
t is the quantity of oil imported
to the US, GDPt is nominal gross domestic product and P GDP
t is the GDP de￿ ator.
Total factor productivity (TFP)












Working hours Ht is calculated from total Current Population Survey (CPS) hours worked
divided by noninstitutional population from age 16 to 64 reported in Cociuba (2008). Kt is
constructed from real gross domestic product, real net stock of ￿xed assets taken from the NIPA
tables. Et is the sum of the quantity of oil imported into the US and the quantity of oil produced
in the US.
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17Table 1: Baseline parameters
Parameter Value Description
￿ 0:99 Quarterly subjective discount rate
￿ 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
￿ 1 ￿ (1 ￿ :1)
0:25 Quarterly depreciation rate of capital
￿ :65 Labor Share




:4 Import share of crude oil in the U.S.
18Oil Price U.S. Output
 corr with data std  corr with data std
1973:1Q to 1983:4Q 0.69 1.17 0.92 1.02
1984:1Q to 2007:4Q 0.56 0.40 0.75 1.44
Simulated Result
Table 2: Correlation between the model-gererate series and the actual data.
Std reports the standard deviations of the model-generated series
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Figure 1: Upper panel shows the cross-correlation between oil price at t
and output at t+j. The lower panel shows the response of output to a unit
increase in oil price. The Y-axis denotes the deviation of the variables
from the trend, and the X-axis denotes the quarter after the shock.
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Figure 2: Responses of oil price (upper panel) and output (lower panel) to a
change in each of the exogenous variable. For the OPEC oil production and
the U.S. oil production, 1% drop from the trend at period zero, and
subsequent declines by 90% at each period are considered. For TFP, 1%
rise at period zero and subsequent declines is feeded. The right scale is used
for the output response to change in TFP (lower panel). The left scale is
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Model Prediction Actual data
Figure 3: Upper panel shows time path of the oil price. Lower panel shows
that of the U.S. output. For both panels, Y-axis indicates the deviation of
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Figure 4: The upper panel shows the cross-correlation between oil price at
t and output at t+j. The lower panel shows the response of output to a
unit increase in oil price. The Y-axis denotes the deviation of the variables
from the trend, and the X-axis denotes the quarter after the shock. The
model-generated series are used for estimation. Con￿dence intervals are
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Output (Left Scale) Oil price (Right Scale)
Figure 5: Upper panel indicates time path of jdotj where dot stands for the
sum of the variations in the OPEC oil production and the U.S. oil
production. The middle panel indicates that of jdAtj where dAt stands for
the TFP variation. The lower panel indicates (dot)(dAt). Average of the
time series for pre-1984 period is denoted by the dotted line, and that for
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TFP variation (Simulation II)
Actual data
Benchmark Simulation
Figure 6: The time path of the oil price from simulation I (upper panel)
and simulation II (lower panel). Actual data and the result from the
benchmark simulation are depicted for comparison. Note that in
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TFP variation (Simulation II)
Actual data
Benchmark Simulation
Figure 7: The time path of the output from simulation I (upper panel)
and simulation II (lower panel). Actual data and the result from the
benchmark simulation are depicted for comparison. Note that in
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Pre-1984 Post-1984
Figure 8: Impulse response of TFP to a unit decrease in the oil supply
(sum of OPEC oil production and U.S. oil production). The Y-axis
denotes the deviation of the variables from the trend, and the X-axis
denotes the quarter after the shock. Con￿dence intervals are shown by
dotted lines.
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